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This article sets out the major tenets of new materialism, and maps out its implications for 
international law.  It considers what new materialism might offer for those of us working 
within international law in the way of new insights, resources, practices or politics.  It first 
sets the contours of new materialism within the broader material turn.  It then elaborates 
three main tenets of new materialism’s methodology, theory and ontology: its attention to 
matter in its physicality; the embedded and entangled subject; and the vitality or agency of 
objects.  The article focuses on how new materialist work might help us to understand, first, 
subjectivity and second, power and accountability in international law.  It concludes that 
new materialist approaches offer important and compelling insights, working against 
entrenched categories and structures that continue to perpetuate or excuse violence and 
harm in international law’s doctrines and practices.  These insights provide resources for 
rethinking power and subjectivity, and the role these play in international law.  However, 
those of us working to consider how we can respond to pressing crises of justice and co-
existence within international law may find new materialism most powerful when brought 
into relation, and deep conversation, with more structural methodologies.  Notably ‘older’ 
(Marxist or historical) materialisms grasp embedded power relations and deep-rooted 
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systemic harms in more concrete ways.  This is, the article concludes, a conversation that 
international law scholars are well placed to contribute to, deepening both ‘old’ and ‘new’ 
materialist insights for international law. 
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methodology.  
 
1. Introduction:  
 
Recent events have brought starkly into view humans’ entanglements in the natural world, 
and our inability to control and insulate ourselves from them.  In the Australian summer of 
2019/20, after months of severe drought, bushfires burned out of control.  Ash and smoke 
filled the sky and fell on the water, and apocalyptic images of Australia’s major landmarks – 
the Sydney Harbour Bridge, the white sails of the Opera House – were broadcast 
worldwide.1  The fires burnt for 79 days destroying homes, wildlife and ecosystems across 
an area the size of South Korea,2  and effectively doubled Australia’s annual carbon 
emissions.3  In early January 2020, a highly contagious virus, the severe acute respiratory 
syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) began its rapid spread across the world.  Declared a 
pandemic by the World Health Organization in March 2020, the resulting disease, Covid-19, 
had, by December of that year, infected 72,225,203 and killed 1,612,021.4  In response to 
the virus, borders were closed, supply chains suspended, and lockdowns imposed, 
foregrounding our reliance on global flows of goods and people.  As the Northern 
                                                             
1 A. Beatty, ‘L’est de l’Australie asphyxié par la fumée des incendies’ La Presse, 9 December 2019 
www.lapresse.ca/international/asie-et-oceanie/2019-12-09/l-est-de-l-australie-asphyxie-par-la-fumee-des-
incendies.   
2 C. Chang, ‘The devastating toll of Australia’s bushfires revealed’ News.Com.Au, 11 March 2020 
www.news.com.au/technology/environment/climate-change/the-devastating-toll-of-australias-bushfires-
revealed/news-story/24e21e16fe0cd016dff86b3bed24a339. 
3 A. Freedman, ‘Australia’s greenhouse gas emissions effectively double as a result of unprecedented bush 
fires’ Washington Post, 25 January 2020 www.washingtonpost.com/weather/2020/01/24/australia-bush-fires-
have-nearly-doubled-countrys-annual-greenhouse-gas-emissions/. 
4 Data as at 14 December 2020.  See Johns Hopkins University, Coronavirus Resource Centre, COVID-19 
Dashboard by the Center for Systems Science and Engineering (CSSE) at Johns Hopkins, 
https://coronavirus.jhu.edu/map.html. 
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Hemisphere moved into summer, wildfires engulfed the West Coast of the United States.5  
The residents of Beirut are still living amid ruins, after a toxic combination of ammonium 
nitrate, fire, neglect and corruption sparked a massive explosion that shattered the city.6   
These events bring into the foreground the ways in which we are interlaced with the 
world beyond our own skin.  The smoke, ash, and carbon released by the fires; the physical, 
chemical and political explosion in Lebanon’s vibrant capital; and the virus’ invisible 
pathways have demonstrated the ability of the material things of the world to penetrate 
and infect, to move and spread.  They do so in ways that show little respect for our 
conception of ourselves as bounded entities, set apart from and able to control the world 
around us.  At the same time, these unfolding events reveal patterned and predictable 
harms.  Migrant and indentured workers, the homeless, and those in precarious or 
subsistence work are especially vulnerable not only to environmental harms, but to viral 
infection and to the exploitations built into the global economy.   
Current crises thus foreground material conditions.  These range from our very 
tangible impacts on the planet, such as human encroachment on remote spaces and animal 
habitats (with their impacts for biodiversity, ecosystems and disease vectors7) to the 
material living conditions of millions of human beings who go without adequate food, work 
and shelter.8  The impacts are global, though unevenly experienced.  These events call into 
question ideas that have been dominant since the Enlightenment and which are repeatedly 
reinforced in liberal, western explanations of the world: ideas of humans as sole agents, 
acting over a passive nature.  Instead, these phenomena show other aspects of the world as 
vibrant, uncontrollable, and deeply present in our homes, bodies and social structures.  
                                                             
5 H. Kelly, A. Freedman and J. Samenow, ‘California wildfires burn 771,000 acres in one week, killing 5 and 
degrading air’ Washington Post 22 August 2020 www.washingtonpost.com/weather/2020/08/20/california-
wildfires-evacuations/. 
6  Arianne Shahvisi, ‘An explosion didn’t burn Beirut to the ground – decades of political greed and neglect did’ 
The Independent, 26 August 2020 www.independent.co.uk/independentpremium/long-reads/beirut-
explosion-news-blast-lebanon-government-corruption-poverty-a9679546.html. 
7 See J. Vidal, ‘Human impact on wildlife to blame for spread of viruses, says study’ The Guardian 8 April 2020 
www.theguardian.com/environment/2020/apr/08/human-impact-on-wildlife-to-blame-for-spread-of-viruses-
says-study-aoe. 
8 J. Linarelli, M. E. Salomon and M. Sornarajah (eds.), The Misery of International Law: Confrontations with 
Injustice in the Global Economy (2018); A. Orford, ‘International Law and the Populist Moment: A Comment on 
Martti Koskenniemi’s Enchanted by the Tools? International Law and Enlightenment’ (2019) 113 ASIL 
Proceedings of the Annual Meeting 3 at 26. 
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They prompt anxiety and suffering,9 but also an opportunity for reconsidering the 
assumptions that we use to explain the world. 
Might considering wider views of agency that stress the relation of all entities, the    
entanglements between and among human and non-human, and the vibrancy of matter and 
the stuff of the world offer new avenues and creative paths forward?  These are questions 
that new materialist thinkers are already contemplating. What might their work contribute 
to those of us working in international law to contest global harms, exploitation and 
injustice?  This article seeks to open up these questions and prompt a deeper reflection on 
new materialist thought for international law.  Accordingly, in the following sections this 
article sets out the main tenets of new materialism, and maps out its implications for 
international law.  It considers what new materialism might offer in the way of new insights, 
resources, practices or politics.   
Harnessing new materialist insights can help to undermine the grip of Eurocentric, 
idealist doctrines and rules.  These doctrines, which separate mind from matter, ‘man’ from 
nature, subject from object continue to structure who and what is accorded rights and 
subjectivity, power and agency versus who or what counts as a passive object, ripe for 
exploitation in international law. They can also help us to see the way that authority operates 
in international law, when expected centres of power suddenly seem hollow.  These tools and 
methods, as discussed in the sections below, offer fresh ways of seeing.  The insights of new 
materialist thinking can help illuminate in new ways the role that international legal doctrines 
continue to play in perpetrating injustice, violence and harm, as well as how we might use 
international law to contest such harm. However, critiques of new materialism caution that 
we might need to bring these insights into conversation with other critical tools, notably, 
other and ‘older’ materialisms (such as Marxist or historical materialism) that focus squarely 
on structures and systemic patterns of inequality and abuse, in order to adequately contest 
such abuses.   
In the next section (2), I set the contours of new materialism within the broader 
material turn.  I then, in section 3, elaborate three main tenets of new materialism: its 
                                                             
9 I acknowledge that these anxieties reflect the scholarship, conversations, and media discourse in the context 
in which I am situated, and that they may not speak to the anxieties of other constituencies and communities 
contesting or working with or within international law.  On situated knowledge, from an early new materialist 
perspective on objectivity, see D. Haraway, ‘Situated Knowledges: The Science Question in Feminism and the 
Privilege of Partial Perspective’, (1988) 14 Feminist Studies 575. 
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attention to matter in its physicality; the embedded and entangled subject; and the vitality or 
agency of objects.  I also position my argument in relation to materialist thinking in law.  In 
the following section (4), I consider what these insights offer for those seeking to understand, 
or contest, the workings of international law, and also address the limits of these insights, 
attending to critiques of new materialist theories.  I focus on how new materialist work might 
help us to understand first, subjectivity and second, authority or power, in international law.  
I conclude in section 5 that new materialist approaches offer important new ways of seeing 
the world. However, we might need to look elsewhere – harnessing also more structural 
critiques and methodologies, for tools to hold power meaningfully to account.  These tools 
are readily to hand in international legal scholarship and critique: Marxist and critical 
international law scholars have built a scaffolding of ideas that pay careful attention to power 
and structure, and bringing these perspectives and insights to bear on new materialism is a 
productive project, and one, I conclude, that prompts an important research agenda going 
forward.   
 
 
2. Mapping the material turn  
 
 
A distinct material turn is currently animating work across the humanities and social 
sciences.  Not only capturing the scholarly moment, things and objects have seized the 
public imagination. High profile object-focused museum exhibitions from the Victoria and 
Albert Museum’s ‘Disobedient Objects’ and the British Museum/BBC Radio 4 ‘History of the 
world in 100 Objects’10 to a range of object-centred biographies11 have proliferated. These 
                                                             
10 Victoria and Albert Museum, Disobedient Objects: About the Exhibition, available at 
www.vam.ac.uk/content/exhibitions/disobedient-objects/disobedient-objects-about-the-exhibition/. See also 
C. Flood and G. Grindon, Disobedient Objects (2014).  The British Museum and BBC Radio 4 collaboration 
began as a 100-part radio series presented by the Museum’s then Director Neil MacGregor, with short 
expositions of the Museum’s objects.  See, www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b00nrtd2/episodes/downloads.  The 
project spawned a book, N. MacGregor, A History of the World in 100 Objects, (2010) and an internationally 
travelling exhibition, and MacGregor has followed this object focussed format in further projects see, e.g., N. 
MacGregor, Germany: Memories of a Nation (2016) and Living with the Gods: On Beliefs and Peoples (2018). 
11 See, e.g., L. Zuckerman, The Potato (1999); R. Hewitt, Map of a Nation: A Biography of the Ordnance Survey 
(2010); E. de Waal, The Hare with Amber Eyes: A Hidden Inheritance (2011). 
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sit alongside popular science writing focussing on matter and materials,12 and a vogue for 
curation, which now encompasses our wardrobes, bookshelves, even diets.13  Things have 
grasped the popular imagination in striking ways.  At the academic end of the spectrum, this 
‘turn’14 involves new theories, methodologies, and ontologies, which seek to consider the 
material world from new angles, and in new relationships and configurations, with both 
human subjects and with existing organizations of power or of nature.  It is concerned with 
recovering a number of existing approaches which have given attention to objects or things; 
using cross- or inter-disciplinary insights from areas where objects have long been given 
serious attention, such as archaeology, anthropology and museum studies.15  It also feeds 
off closer engagement between the humanities and social sciences, on the one hand, and 
physics and mathematics,16  biological17 and information sciences,18 on the other.  It is 
particularly inspired by work in the sciences which itself moves beyond a Cartesian or 
Newtonian understanding of matter as something stable, tangible and inert.19  At least some 
of this work is also prompted by the need to give space to marginalized and denied 
worldviews, including those of Indigenous Peoples.20  Much of it has a strong feminist 
                                                             
12 See, e.g., M. Miodownik, Stuff Matters: The Strange Stories of the Marvellous Materials that Shape our Man-
Made World (2013). 
13 See, e.g., D. Balzer, Curationism (2014); I. Mida et al., ‘Scholars’ Roundtable Presentation: Everyone Their 
Own Curator: Professionalism and Authority in the Digital Age’, (2017) 43(1) Dress: The Journal of the Costume 
Society of America 45, at 56, and the best-selling M. Kondo, The Life-Changing Magic of Tidying Up: The 
Japanese Art of Decluttering and Organizing (trans. C. Hirano) (2014). 
14 On the ‘turn’ specifically see, T. Bennett and P. Joyce, ‘Material Powers: Introduction’, in T. Bennett and P. 
Joyce, (eds.), Material Powers: Cultural Studies, History and the Material Turn (2010), 1-21.  
15 See, e.g., the discussion in D. Hicks and M. C. Beaudry, ‘Introduction: Material Culture Studies: A Reactionary 
View’, in D. Hicks and M. C. Beaudry (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Material Culture Studies (2010), 1-21. 
16 See, for e.g., D. Coole and S. Frost, ‘Introducing the New Materialisms’, in D. Coole and S. Frost (eds.), New 
Materialisms: Ontology, Agency, and Politics (2010), 10-14 for a synopsis of relevant developments in physics 
and in Complexity and Chaos Theory; Karen Barad, Meeting the Universe Halfway: Quantum Physics and the 
Entanglement of Matter and Meaning (2007); Q. Meilliassoux, After Finitude: An Essay on the Necessity of 
Contingency (trans. R. Brassier) (2008).  
17 Coole and Frost ibid. at 15; S. Jasanoff (ed.), Reframing Rights: Bioconstitutionalism in the Genetic Age 
(2011).  
18 J-H. Passoth, ‘From Hardware to Software to Runtime: The Politics of (at Least) Three Digital Materialities’, in 
U. T. Kissmann and J. van Loon (eds.), Discussing New Materialism (2019), 173-89. 
19 Barad, supra note 16; See also ‘Interview with Karen Barad’ in R. Dolphjin and I. van der Tuin, New 
Materialism: Interviews and Cartographies, (2012) at 62-8.  
20 See, e.g., A. Ravenscroft, ‘Strange Weather: Indigenous Materialisms, New Materialism, and Colonialism’, 
(2018) 5(3) Cambridge Journal of Postcolonial Literary Inquiry 353-70; P. Hinton, T. Mehrabi, and J. Barla, ‘New 
Materialisms_New Colonialisms’ COST Action IS1307 ‘New Materialism. Networking European Scholarship on 
‘How Matter Comes to Matter’’, subgroup two: New Materialisms on the Crossroads of the Natural and 
Human Sciences position paper, available at newmaterialism.eu/content/5-working-groups/2-working-group-
2/position-papers/subgroup-position-paper-_-new-materialisms_new-colonialisms.pdf; but see J. Rosiek and S. 
L. Pratt, ‘The New Materialisms and Indigenous Theories of Non-Human Agency: Making the Case for 
Respectful Anti-Colonial Engagement’, (2020) 26 Qualitative Inquiry 331-46, demonstrating relatively little 
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stance, and new materialist thinkers have also contributed significantly to broader feminist 
thought.21  Finally, the material turn is a response to, or a reaction against, the limits of the 
linguistic or discursive turn, which dominated work in the humanities and social sciences 
until at least the 1990s.22   
The novelty of this turn to things has been disputed, and is in fact often 
acknowledged as a ‘return’,23 but it is undeniable that the reinvigoration of interest in 
objects, things and materiality is given fresh energy when coupled with new methodologies, 
theories and ontologies emerging, particularly under the banner of ‘new materialism’ itself. 
For legal scholars, this ‘turn’ has given rise to a growing body of scholarship exploring 
various paths forward for law, materiality and their interrelationships.  These paths of 
enquiry have led in three main directions, though they intersect and share terrain.  The first 
focuses on law’s material culture, beginning with objects, from the mundane to the museum 
piece.  These objects are engaged in creative ways – for example in the work of Perry-
Kessaris,24 and Hohmann and Joyce,25 - to think through how material things and laws are 
co-constituted, and to decentre text as the main arena for legal interpretation and 
relevance.  
A second approach seeks to move beyond anthropocentrism toward more generous 
understandings of agency, as well as more plural forms of law.  For instance, Davies’ work 
employs a broad range of materially inflected methodologies and theories, to ‘unlimit’ law, 
through an engagement with its ‘diverse spaces, systems, forms of subjectivity, relations, 
discourses, narratives, imaginings, and things from which norms emerge and are 
                                                             
articulation between Indigenous agential ontologies and ‘agential realism’ in new materialism, and calling for 
greater engagement. 
21 See, e.g., D. Haraway, ‘A Cyborg Manifesto’ (1985) Socialist Review 80; Barad, supra note 16; R. Braidotti, 
Nomadic Subjects: Embodiment and Sexual Difference in Contemporary Feminist Theory (2nd ed) (2011); E. 
Grosz, ‘Feminism, Materialism and Freedom’ in Coole and Frost, supra note 16.       
22 See, e.g., K. Barad, ‘Posthumanist Performativity: Toward an Understanding of How Matter Comes to 
Matter’, (2003) 28(3) Journal of Women in Culture and Society 801 at 801-2; M. DeLanda, ‘A New Philosophy of 
Society: Assemblage Theory and Social Complexity’, (2006) at 16; B. Washick and E. Wingrove, ‘Politics that 
Matter: Thinking about Power and Justice with the New Materialists’, (2015) 14 Contemporary Political Theory 
63 at 64; Coole and Frost supra note 16, at 2-3, 6; ‘Interview with Rosi Braidotti’ in R. Dolphjin and I. van der 
Tuin, supra note 19 at 21.     
23 See, e.g., the discussion of this point in Coole and Frost, supra note 16 at 4; J. Bennett, Vibrant Matter: A 
Political Ecology of Things (2010), xiii-xix; B. Brown, ‘Thing Theory’, in B. Brown (ed.), Things (2004) at 13-14.  
24 A. Perry-Kessaris’ ‘Legal Treasures’ and ‘Pop Up Museum of Legal Objects’ Projects, ‘Legal Treasures’ 
available at amandaperrykessaris.org/legaltreasure/ and ‘Pop Up Museum of Legal Objects’ available at 
amandaperrykessaris.org/collections/pop-up-museum-of-legal-objects-2017/ 
25 J. Hohmann and D. Joyce (eds) International Law’s Objects (2018). 
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formalised’.26 In doing so, Davies finds a ‘material-plural’ law that is enmeshed in, emerging 
from, and constituted in the material and the social.27  Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos has 
used legal material metaphors to help perceive the fleshly materiality of the law, and to 
consider locations and relations of agency and responsibility, informed by among other 
theoretical work, new materialism. 28   
Finally, a third important strand seeks to confront squarely what might be particular 
to law’s materiality and its matters.  This has led to a body of scholarship on ‘legal 
materiality.’   These scholars have sought more explicitly to open up law as a category.  
Prompted by the failure of a number of material theories or methodologies to look beyond 
the given of ‘the law’ as a bounded or reified entity, Kang writes of new materialism’s 
‘missing perspective’,29 the lack of ‘regard and feeling for the specificities of legal materiality 
itself.’30  There is, she argues ‘neither an openness towards defining and sensing the matters 
of law nor an attempt to understand legal materiality as a distinct phenomenon.’31  In this 
vein, Pottage interrogates the ways in which Latour’s application of Actor-Network-Theory 
to law failed to reach the critical potential it brought when applied to science.32  He 
foregrounds the need to fully interrogate what law is in any material theory.  Rather than 
‘strain so hard to materialize law’ Pottage asks, ‘why not begin with the extensive 
potentialities of “materiality” and ask what becomes of “law” if we try to hold those 
potentialities open?’33  The first approach, he argues, has the effect of reifying law, while 
beginning with materiality might help to dissolve ‘law’ as a stable body of knowledge, 
practice or regulation in favour of more powerful explanations.34  Building upon this 
critique, scholars such as Kang and Kendall have turned to consider the distinctions among 
                                                             
26 M. Davies, Law Unlimited: Materialism, Pluralism and Legal Theory (2017), 154.   
27 Ibid, 155. 
28 A. Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos, ‘Flesh of the Law: Material Legal Metaphors’ (2016) 43(1) JOLS 45-65.  
29 H. Y. Kang, ‘Law’s Materiality: Between Concrete Matters and Abstract Forms, or how Matter becomes 
Material’ in A. Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos (ed) Routledge Handbook of Law and Theory (2018), 456. 
30 Ibid, 457. 
31 Ibid.  
32 A. Pottage, ‘The materiality of What’ (2012) 39(1) JOLS 167.  See also Pottage’s object of critique, B. Latour 
‘The Making of Law – An Ethnography of the Conseil d’Etat’ (2009) (trans M. Brilman, et al).   
33 Pottage, ibid, 180.   
34 Ibid. 
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matters, materiality and meanings.35  Legal materialism, for them, involves a particular 
distinction between matters and materials: 
 
whereas law’s matters are not necessarily physical elements but rather issues or 
problematizations, materials are the substances, attributes or properties that are 
enlisted in acts of interpretation. Legal materiality is concerned with how materials 
come to matter to law by being engaged in the production of legal meaning through 
interpretive and representational practices.36 
 
As Kang explains it, ‘[l]egal materiality can be understood as a mode by which the concrete 
matters come to be enlisted to define a matter of law; for example, how an invented 
scientific object comes to be signified as a patentable invention, or how recording formats 
and an expert’s performance in court interweave to determine the legality of a copy.’37  She 
argues therefore, ‘materiality in the legal context is an argumentative, hermeneutic process 
involving several steps of representation and interpretation, rather than denoting an innate 
property or a physical thing.’38   
 At the same time, international law scholars, who have also contributed to the 
developing scholarship discussed in the previous paragraphs, have begun to turn their 
attention specifically to international law’s materiality, asking how international legal 
regimes and rules structure subjectivity, sexuality, the home, food production, or movement 
within and across borders.39 Their scholarship raises the point that international law is not 
just ‘an ideological project that has material consequences’40 but can be understood as ‘a 
material project in itself.’41  Scholars have focused on the role of everyday actors in the 
                                                             
35 H. Y. Kang and S. Kendall, ‘Legal Materiality’ in S. Stern, M. Del Mar and B. Meyler (eds) The Oxford 
Handbook of Law and the Humanities (2019). See also Kang, supra note 29. 
36 Kang and Kendall, ibid, 21.  Original emphasis. 
37 Kang, supra note 29, 465. 
38 Ibid.   
39 See, e.g., the contributions in J. Hohmann and D. Joyce, supra note 25; R. Kapur, Gender, Alterity and Human 
Rights: Freedom in a Fishbowl (2018); N. Tzouvala ‘Food for the Global Market: The Neoliberal Reconstruction 
of Agriculture in Occupied Iraq (2003-2004) and the Role of International Law’ (2016) 17(1) Global Jurist; L. 
Eslava, Local Space, Global Life: The Everyday Operation of International Law and Development (2015); D. R. 
Quiroga-Villamarín ‘Containing Globalization: A Material History of Transnational Regulation through Shipping 
Containers (1956 – 1968)’ (2020) available at https://repository.graduateinstitute.ch/record/298599. 
40 L. Eslava and S. Pahuja, ‘Beyond the (Post)Colonial: TWAIL and the Everyday Life of International Law’, (2012) 
45(2) Journal of Law and Politics in Africa, Asia and Latin America-Verfassung und Recht in Übersee 195 at 202. 
41 Ibid.  
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legitimisation, contestation or practice of international law,42 and have harnessed artefacts 
and the world as tangibly experienced to consider international law as a material practice.43  
International legal scholars are engaging with posthumanist feminisms, themselves inspired 
by and allied with new materialism, particularly in interrogating the fields of warfare and 
military technology.44  A notable strand also engages new materialism to reframe 
international law’s relationship with ‘nature’ and the environment.45  There are also serious 
attempts to move beyond Eurocentric, Enlightenment understandings of international law, 
including through recovering fundamentally more relational and connected worldviews, to 
push toward re-creating international law as sustainable and inclusive.46 
While the material turn is sometimes seen as synonymous with new materialism,47 
for me the material turn can be understood more broadly, and it is specifically new 
materialism that I engage with here.  In the next section, I introduce the contours of new 
materialism, and then set out what I see as its three main tenets, before turning to consider 
what new materialism offers in the way of understanding issues of subjectivity, and power 
and accountability for international law. 
 
 
3. The contours of new materialism 
 
                                                             
42 Eslava (2015), supra note 39. T. Aalberts and T. Gammeltoft-Hansen (eds.), The Changing Practices of 
International Law (2018); and F. Johns, ‘Data, Detection, and the Redistribution of the Sensible in International 
Law’, (2017) 111(1) AJIL 1. 
43 See the contributions in (2017) 5(1) LRIL, special issue on History, Anthropology and the Archive of 
International Law; Hohmann and Joyce, supra note 25; R. Vos, ‘Walking Along the Rue de la Loi: EU Façades as 
Front- and Backstage of Transnational Legal Practice’ in L. J. M. Boer and S. Stalk (eds.) Backstage Practices of 
Transnational Law (2019); and A. Perry-Kessaris’ ‘Legal Treasures’ and ‘Pop Up Museum of Legal Objects’ 
projects supra note 24, in which a number of international lawyers have participated.  
44 E. Jones, ‘A Posthuman-Xenofeminist Analysis of the Discourse on Autonomous Weapons Systems and Other 
Killing Machines’, (2018) 44(1) AFLJ 93; M. Arvidsson, ‘The Swarm that we Already are: Artificial Intelligent (AI) 
Swarming “Insect Drones”, Targeting and International Humanitarian Law in a Posthuman Ecology’, (2020) 
11(1) JHRE 114; G. Heathcote, ‘War’s Perpetuity: Disabled Bodies of War and the Exoskeleton of Equality’, 
(2018) 44(1) AFLJ 71. 
45 U. Nataranjan and J. Dehm, ‘Where is the Environment? Locating Nature in International Law’, (2019) 3 
TWAILR: Reflections available at twailr.com/where-is-the-environment-locating-nature-in-international-law/; 
A. Grear, ‘Introduction: “Staying with the Trouble”*- Environmental Justice for the Anthropocene-
Capitalocene’, in A. Grear (ed.), Environmental Justice (2020). 
46 See K. Khoday et al., ‘Locating Nature: Making and Unmaking International Law: Introduction’, (2014) 23(3) 
LJIL 571, and the further papers in that Symposium issue, as well as Natarajan and Dehm, ibid; Grear, ibid. 
47 I. Clever and W. Ruberg, ‘Beyond Cultural History?  The Material Turn, Praxiology, and Body History’, (2014) 
3 Humanities 546 at 547.  
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New materialism can be seen as a methodology, a theory, and an ontology.  In a series of 
interviews with leading new materialist figures, Dolphijn and van der Tuin noted in 2012 
that while much has been made of the materialism of new materialism, ‘a clear perspective 
on how new materialism is new remains underdeveloped.’48  Nevertheless, in my view new 
materialism remains distinct from previous materially astute approaches.  It is certainly the 
case that new materialist thinking has been accused of failing to acknowledge its debt to a 
number of materially attuned approaches,49  and of ignoring pre-existing engagement with 
some of its central claims.50  Its leading scholars, however, are at pains to point out 
connections, as well as breaks.51    In addition, while related to a number of material 
approaches, from ‘thing theory’52 to Actor-Network-Theory (ANT),53 science and technology 
studies (STS),54 and Assemblage Theory,55 new materialism has distinct features and aims. I 
also distinguish new materialism at what might be thought of as the ‘other end’ of the 
spectrum: from approaches that go beyond it, and insist that ‘the Real’ is an ultimate 
truth.56  For that reason, I will exclude from my discussion here those further reaches of 
materialism that are grouped under the banner of object oriented ontology (OOO) and new 
speculative realism,57 even though these are sometimes also considered ‘new 
materialism.’58  New materialism is, for me,59 distinguishable as a distinct approach for three 
                                                             
48 Dolphijn and van der Tuin, supra note 19, at 115.  Original emphasis. 
49 See, e.g., S. Ahmed, ‘Some Preliminary Remarks on the Founding Gestures of “New Materialism”’, (2008) 15 
EJWS 23; C. Devellennes and B. Dillet, ‘Questioning New Materialisms: An Introduction’, (2018) 35 Theory, 
Culture and Society 5, at 7. 
50 See, e.g., the discussion in Davies, supra note 26, 57. 
51 See, e.g., Coole and Frost, supra note 16 at 176; Bennett, supra note 23.  
52 See especially Brown, supra note 23.  
53 In particular, the work of Latour and of Callon, e.g., B. Latour, Reassembling the Social: An Introduction to 
Actor-Network-Theory (2005); B. Latour, We Have Never Been Modern (trans. C. Porter) (1993); M. Callon, 
‘Some Elements of a Sociology of Translation: Domestication of the Scallops and the Fisherman of St. Brieuc 
Bay’, (1984) 32(1) The Sociological Review 196. 
54 See, e.g., S. Jasanoff, (ed.) States of Knowledge: The Co-production of Science and the Social Order (2004). 
55 G. Deleuze and F. Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus (1980); M. DeLanda, Assemblage Theory (2016). 
56 See Coole and Frost, supra note 16, at 11 who insist that ‘acknowledging nondiscursive material efficacy’ is 
not ‘equivalent to espousing a metaphysical claim regarding the Real as ultimate truth’.    
57 See the work of Graham Harman and Timothy Morton, for e.g., G. Harman, Object-Oriented-Ontology: A 
New Theory of Everything (2018); G. Harman, Speculative Realism: An Introduction (2018); T. Morton, 
Hyperobjects: Philosophy and Ecology after the End of the World, (2013); T. Morton, Realist Magic: Objects, 
Ontology, Causality, (2013).  
58 See Dophijn and van der Tuin, supra note 19.   
59 Other delineations include Devellennes and Dillet, who identify three criteria of what makes new 
materialism: ‘First, there is an emphasis on the novelty of the theory. Second, there is an ontological claim that 
is made (either explicitly or implicitly) about the nature of matter and how it impacts our lives. And finally, 
there are methodical implications of taking material objects seriously in our academic practices.’ Devellennes 
and Dillet, supra note 49 at 37.  Gamble, Hanan and Nail note three trajectories of new materialism, which 
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intertwined reasons.  The first is its insistence on giving attention to matter in its very 
physicality; the second its position on the entanglement or intra-action of all matter; and 
the third is its openness to considering matter as vital or agentive.   
 
 
3.1. The physicality of matter 
 
New Materialism seeks to give serious attention to matter in its very physicality.  As Coole 
and Frost write, introducing new materialism in an important early volume:  
 
we inhabit an ineluctably material world … surrounded by, immersed in, matter.  
We are ourselves composed of matter.  We experience its restlessness and 
intransigence even as we reconfigure and consume it.  … Our existence depends 
from one moment to the next on myriad micro-organisms and diverse higher 
species, on our own hazily understood bodily and cellular reactions and on 
pitiless cosmic motions, on the material artifacts and natural stuff that populate 
our environment, as well as on socioeconomic structures that produce and 
reproduce the conditions of our everyday lives.60   
 
In light of the ‘massive materiality’ of the world, Coole and Frost ask ‘how could we be other 
than materialist?  How could we ignore the power of matter and the ways it materializes in 
our ordinary experiences or fail to acknowledge the primacy of matter in our theories?’61 
Thus, new materialism turns attention to things and objects, nature and the body, 
which western philosophy have so often ignored, or treated only as the binary foils for 
human action and subjectivity.62  It is committed to ‘raising the profile of the physical world 
                                                             
they name ‘negative new materialism’ ‘vital new materialism’ and ‘performative or ‘pedetic’ new materialism.’  
See C.N. Gamble, J.S. Hanan and T. Nail, ‘What is New Materialism?’, (2019) 24(6) Angelaki: Journal of the 
Theoretical Humanities 111. 
60 Coole and Frost, supra note 16 at 1.  
61 Ibid. 
62 See the synopsis in J. Hohmann, ‘The Lives of Objects’ in Hohmann and Joyce, supra note 25 at 30-32.  
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as an integral part of the social.’63  As Barad puts it simply: in investigating ‘how matter 
comes to matter. How matter makes itself felt.’64 
This entails, in common with other materially attuned approaches, approaching 
things with an open mind, and seeking to understand the work objects or things, matter and 
materials, do in the world.  Moreover, it means letting objects speak without, so far as 
possible, an overlay of preconceptions built up through the received categories established 
from, at least, the Enlightenment onwards in western thought and the disciplines.  On many 
planes, and in ever shifting and re-forming ways, we are tangled together as entities in the 
world.  This process of entanglement or intra-action of entities is the next key point I will 
address. 
 
3.2. The embedded and entangled subject  
 
As already implicit above, new materialism stresses the embeddedness of all humans 
in the material world.  In fact, new materialists understand entities to be mutually 
constituted through and in their relations with each other.  Rejecting the idea of the human 
as a fully formed subject sitting apart from the natural world, new materialists argue that 
we are enmeshed in it.  The meaning of the subject is intelligible only in relation to the 
object, not in the sense of a binary either/or, but through engagement or entanglement. A 
central undertaking for new materialisms is to question that there are discrete, fixed, and 
pre-existing units that can be understood to relate to each other.  Instead, as Barad – 
feminist physicist and leading new materialist – puts it, in intra-active engagement, entities 
emerge from their relating.65  She writes that the ‘primary ontological units are not “things” 
but phenomena – dynamic topological 
reconfigurings/entanglements/relationalities/(re)articulations of the world’.66  Thus 
‘[a]gency is not an attribute but the ongoing reconfigurings of the world.  The universe is 
agential intra-activity in its becoming.’67  New materialism brings everything into relation.68  
                                                             
63 Davies, supra note 26, at 57.   
64 Dolphjin and van der Tuin, supra note 19 at 59. 
65 Barad, supra note 16 at 137 – 141. Original emphasis. 
66 Ibid., at 141. 
67 Ibid.   
68 Davies, supra note 26 at 58.  
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As theory, new materialism ‘emphasises the forms of relationality – resistance, mutual 
reliance, exclusion, mimicry, parasitism, autopoiesis, exchange, coupling, parallelism, 
dominance, subsumption, foreclosure and so forth – out of which in the human world 
subjects and objects are made as such.’69  Davies summarizes these complex ideas lucidly:  
 
There is flow between our bodily molecules and those outside us – in a physical 
sense we may feel as though we have edges, but we are also porous and 
unfinished.  In association with matter, meanings constantly emerge to give 
shape to matter.70  
 
Accordingly, this requires rejecting received binaries: of nature/culture, object/subject, 
female/male, matter/mind for instance.  New materialists identify instead ‘fluxes,’ and seek 
ways of opening up perceived dualisms in productive, even revolutionary ways.71   
This leads to the final aspect of new materialism I wish to draw out.  If there are no 
hard edges between entities in the world, then where does agency lie?  If we are entangled 
and intra-active, becoming and being only in relation with other entities, then, as Bennett 
argues, ‘an actant never really acts alone.  Its efficacy or agency always depends on the 
collaboration, cooperation, or interactive interference of many bodies and forces.’72  This 
leads us to the third point: that new materialism is open to matter as vital, actant, or even 
agent.   
 
3.3. Vital and agentive objects  
 
Entailed in all new materialist thinking is the rejection of the human being as the only node 
of agency or subjectivity, given that, according to new materialism, there is no hard-
bordered ‘human’.  This raises the issue of what has agency in the world.   
Some theorists have focussed specifically on the idea that things or objects have 
vitality and agency in and of themselves.  Bennett’s ‘vibrant matter’ is perhaps one of the 
                                                             
69 Ibid., at 61.   
70 Ibid., at 60. 
71 Dolphijn and van der Tuin, supra note 19 at 85-6. 
72 Bennett, supra note 23, at 21. 
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most enticing, as well as influential, of the new materialist offerings in this respect. Matter, 
as Bennett writes, is vibrant and full of ‘energetic vitality’.73  She suggests that considering 
material things to act and have agency is to notice and insist that they are also ‘quasi agents 
or forces with trajectories, propensities, or tendencies of their own.’74 Things always have 
the capacity to exceed our understanding of them, to break free of their human-designated 
status,75 and in doing so, they ‘manifest traces of independence or aliveness’.76  For 
instance, Bennett ‘emphasize[s], even overemphasize[s], the agentic contributions of 
nonhuman forces (operating in nature, in the human body, and in human artifacts) in an 
attempt to counter the narcissistic reflex of human language and thought.’77 
Other new materialist thinkers are more resistant to categorising matter as having 
agency or an ‘actant’ status.  For example, though Barad’s work is often described as 
‘agential realism’ she notes that she avoids using the terms agent or even actant, ‘because 
these terms work against the relational ontology I am proposing.’78  Rather than agency as 
something held as a property of things or persons, she sees it as ‘an enactment, a matter of 
possibilities for reconfiguring entanglements.’79  This, however, does not relocate agency 
firmly in the human, but insists that agency is a matter of relation, and a process that entails 
a potentially infinite spectrum of matter around and within us. 
Together, these three insights of new materialist thinking operate to unseat the 
sovereign, rational human being as the location of agency and subjectivity, acting over a 
world of passive objects, and from which ‘he’ can separate himself conceptually and 
physically.  They work to give us a picture of the world where agency is shared – moreover, 
where agency comes about as the result of ‘intra-actions’ and entanglements and is an 
unstable and potentially shifting process.  Rather than established hierarchies across 
binaries of subject/object, mind/matter, culture/nature, new materialism locates diffuse 
constellations of agency, and dynamic fluxes of becoming, without a stable centre. 
                                                             
73 Ibid., at 5. 
74 Ibid., at viii. 
75 Brown, supra note 23, at 174-82. 
76 Bennet, supra note 23, at xvi. 
77 Ibid. 
78 Dolphijn and van der Tuin, supra note 19, at 54.  See also Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos, who writes of ‘lively 
agency’ as essentially relational. He defines it as ‘the ability of bodies (animate and inanimate) to withdraw in 
their singularity while connecting to other bodies.’ A Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos ‘Lively Agency: Life and Law 
in the Anthropocene’ in I. Braverman (ed) Animals, Biopolitics, Law: Lively Legalities (2016) at 194.   
79 Dolphijn and van der Tuin, Ibid.   





3.4 A Positioning  
 
As Kang has noted, new materialist work has sometimes failed to grasp a legal sensibility.80  
The insights of new materialism do not map easily onto enquiries concerning law.  On the 
one hand, some new materialist work that deals with law tends to treat law as a given, 
reifying law and excluding it from the searching critique and unpicking that it achieves for 
other entities or institutions.  On the other hand, new materialism raises the question of 
what is left of law if the world is opened up into vibrant interactions among fluid, intra-
acting molecules that operate across space and time and through the boundaries of 
organisms, let alone the boundaries of disciplines, social categories, or institutions.  As Kang 
and Kendall write, ‘[a]s far as law exists in society as a distinct and distinguishable field, a 
legal materialist approach requires accounting for the distinctiveness of law as a category’.81  
From such a perspective, what can we say is distinct to law?   
 The thoughtful works of scholars writing on ‘legal materialism’ discussed above, have 
offered a careful and nuanced consideration of law, its matters, and its materiality.  Some of 
this work, however, still sits uneasily with new materialism as I understand it.  In legal 
materialist accounts, what often remains distinctive to law are language and interpretive 
and textual practices.  Pottage, for example, finds legal materiality as made up out of 
discourse, such as ‘regulatory decisions, laws, administrative measures, scientific 
statements, philosophical, moral and philanthropic arguments’ as well as human 
constructions taking in institutions and architectural formations.82  Or, as Kang writes: ‘If 
there is a specificity to legal materiality in comparison to other materialities, such as a 
scientific one or economic one, it is that law is already always mediated through the legal 
form and language games and that it is backed up by a normative claim.’83  
 Though certainly moving beyond the discursive or linguistic turn that had dominated 
theory and which new materialists react against,84 language, text, and the materials on 
                                                             
80 Kang, supra note 29.  See also Kang and Kendall, supra note 35, at 28. 
81 Kang and Kendall, ibid., 28. 
82 Pottage, supra note 32 at 168. 
83 Kang, supra note 29 at 462-63. 
84 See above note 22.   
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which text is inscribed and through which it is circulated, promulgated, filed, and archived 
remain, for many of these scholars, privileged objects: they underpin the matters of the 
law.85  These are thoughtful contributions, but they appear to stop short, in a number of 
accounts, of the granularity that new materialism brings into view.  This is a granularity in 
which texts can become bits and nodes in networks of data circulation, merging in 
temporary intra-action with the atoms and DNA of finger-marked ink smears and the 
harried body of the court clerk, her microbiome and the airless cubicles of a court’s 
backstage.  
 Importantly, however, this work on legal materiality points out that tensions remain 
in bringing new materialism to bear on law, including international law.  These issues – the 
issue of how to avoid reifying law, yet recognising that it has some distinctness in the world 
– are not resolved, and prompt an important research agenda.  Rather than attempting to 
resolve this tension within this paper, I acknowledge it.  It is the case that efforts to provide 
conceptual contours and define new materialism, and to discuss (international) law can tend 
to construct both as ‘things’, though undeniably contested and unstable ones.  As well as 
the problem already pointed out, this approach is in tension with the stated aims of new 
materialism: with its focus on entanglement and relationality, it seeks to call into question 
the bounded edges of entities, because, as Haraway puts it ‘objects are boundary 
projects’.86  It is not, therefore, a choice that escapes the tensions raised by legal 
materialism and is not unproblematic.  However, from a new materialist perspective, an 
unproblematic choice is not available.  Even defining terms such as ‘international law’ or 
‘the state’ for the purpose of argument serves to work against the conceptual unravelling 
and open weave of the world that new materialist work hopes to bring into view.   These 
tensions appear inescapable.87   
However, bringing new materialist insights to bear on law (here international law) 
invoked as an identifiable entity, remains a worthwhile project.  The work of those taking 
                                                             
85 See also on files and filing, C. Vismann, Files: Law and Media Technology (2008) whose work has been 
influential on these questions for legal materiality; eg Kang and Kendall, supra note 35; T. Johnson ‘Legal 
History and the Material Turn’ in M. D. Dubber and C. Tomlins (eds) The Oxford Handbook of Legal History Vol 
1 (2018) . 
86 Haraway, supra note 9 at 62.  With thanks to Matilda Arvidsson for discussion on this point. 
87 Even the most generative and influential new materialist work has been critiqued for speaking as though 
from a vantage point beyond the assumptions it seeks to call into question.  See, e.g. C. Calvert-Minor 
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J Hohmann, 2020. Forthcoming LJIL 2021. 
19 
 
this approach, such as Latour in his study of the Conseil d’État, though criticised in this 
respect, has been undeniably generative of new and important ways of thinking.88  Indeed, 
even materialist work veering toward the personification of the law – such as that 
acknowledging law’s desires and yearnings – still provides its own fruitful engagements and 
insights between law and materiality.89  The emphasis here is not on what international law 
‘is’ within a new materialist understanding, but on what new materialism shows about this 
‘thing’ that is generally treated as international law.  The project in this paper is to begin to 
think differently using new materialism’s insights, as well as to bring into view its limitations.  
For the purposes of this paper, I concentrate on two specific issues: subjectivity, and power 
and accountability, which I now turn to discuss.   
 
 
4. Diffuse subjects and dispersed authority: new materialist insights and cautionary 
lessons for international law 
 
  
How can we use new materialist insights in novel and helpful ways to understand 
international law, its structures, uses and processes, and how it works in the world?  What 
are the limits of new materialism, and in what ways should we complement or further its 
insights using other (materialist) methodologies, theories or practices?  Although new 
materialist insights have the potential to illuminate a number of issues in international law, 
and are already giving rise to a range of nuanced interrogations of international law and 
some of its effects and impacts in the world,90 I want to concentrate here specifically on 
                                                             
88 See, supra note 32. 
89 See e.g. J. R. Martel, ‘The Law is Not a Thing: Kafkan (Im)materialism and Imitation Jam’ (2019) 23 Law, Text, 
Culture 240, at 242: ‘By looking at what the law is not (at thing) [sic] we can begin to see what it is, a desire for 
power, for tangibility and determination, a want that cannot be satisfied on its own terms’ he writes. 
90 On military technologies, targeting and the laws of war see, e.g., Jones, supra note 44; Arvidsson, supra note 
44; M. Arvidsson, ‘Targeting, Gender, and International Posthumanitarian Law and Practice: Framing The 
Question of the Human in International Humanitarian Law’ (2018) 44(1) AFLJ 9; Heathcote, supra note 44; on 
human rights and environmental law see, e.g., A. Grear ‘Human Rights and New Horizons? Thoughts toward a 
New Juridical Ontology’ (2018) 43(1) Science, Technology and Human Values 129, Grear, supra note 45; and 
Nataranjan and Dehm supra note 45.  On the regulation of infrastructure and big data see B. Kingsbury, 
‘Infrastructure and InfraReg: On Rousing the International Law “Wizards of Is”’ (2019) 8(2) CILJ 171.  For 
another mapping of new or ‘renewed’ materialisms and international law, see D. R. Quiroga-Villamarín, 
‘Domains of Objects, Rituals of Truth: Mapping Intersections between International Legal History and the New 
Materialisms’ (2020) 8 International Politics Review 129.   
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what new materialism tells us about power (and accountability for its use) and subjectivity 
in international law.  I then turn, in conclusion, to suggest that new materialism’s insights 
are most productive when coupled with more structural critiques and methodologies, for 
example drawing from ‘old’ materialisms, for tools to hold power meaningfully to account. I 
also argue that the strength of international legal scholarship in these areas is poised to 
offer important insights in this respect.  
 
4.1. Accidental subjects of international Law – legal and ontological categories for 
more than human rights? 
 
One of the main openings that new materialism offers is in rethinking what counts as a 
subject versus object. If, since the Enlightenment, the subject/object distinction has 
operated both as an organising principle and as a clear division, new materialism makes no 
such claims, seeing entities as entangled and intra-active.91  There is, new materialists have 
argued, no subject versus object, but rather alliances which are shifting, merging and 
unstable, the agency of which is prone to continual change. What might such an approach 
to subjects offer for international protection or regulation of these entities?  Where are the 
borders of the human being, and how might these edges play out in the context of new 
technologies; or existing power relations and politics?  What are the implications of these 
shifts for international law and its politics and regulatory regimes?   
New materialism begins with no stable, hard and fast subject.  Instead, as Coole and 
Frost put it, we see ‘objects forming and remerging within relational fields, bodies 
composing their natural environment in ways that are corporeally meaningful for them, and 
subjectivities being constituted as open series of capacities or potencies that emerge 
hazardously and ambiguously within a multitude of organic and social processes.’92  Such a 
fluid picture of subjectivity may offer new ways to understand how subjects emerge into 
international law, and the ways in which the interplay between the object and subject, the 
emergence or submergence of status or personality, is managed through legal tools.   
                                                             
91 On the perpetual difficulty in maintaining this distinction in theory and practice, see J. Hohmann, ‘Lives of 
Objects’, in Hohmann and Joyce, supra note 25, at 30-33; M. Davies ‘Material Subjects and Vital Objects: 
Prefiguring Property and Rights for an Entangled World’ (2016) 22(2) AJHR 37.  
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New military technologies, artificial intelligence, and automation are all relevant 
fields in which to interrogate the ways that international legal regulation is already engaged 
with beings that are post- or extra-human.  In these fields, post- or extra-human entities, 
evolving out of complex interactions of the technical and the corporal, are already present 
for the purposes of international law, as well as constructed by its regimes and rules.  For 
instance, as Arvidsson has shown with respect to targeting and international humanitarian 
law, not only are who or what counts as a legitimate target for the laws of war identified by 
the conjunction of fleshly and digital bodies,93 but those entities doing the targeting are also 
characterized by biological and digital amalgamations.94  Contemporary high-tech warfare 
thus showcases our ‘posthuman condition of digital and material convergence where 
distinctions between nature and culture, genders, species, and technology are undone.’95  
Much debate, however, over the resulting questions of responsibility, accountability and 
legality, tends to centre back in on the human as a stable and accepted point of reference.96  
New materialist insights into entanglement and intra-action usefully show that this focus is 
sometimes misplaced, and that more productive responses to these technologies need to 
move beyond subject/object binaries, to consider the implications of these relations for 
international law and its doctrines, regimes and principles.  For instance, as Grear writes, 
with reference to questions raised within the frame of human rights, if human beings ‘are 
repositioned as partners in world-making entanglements between multiple, contingently 
identified partners of all kinds – including – increasingly, the machinic’ then ‘the human of 
human rights becomes both contingent and productive: the human becomes a question of 
continuously emergent, evolutive subjectivity/ies for which the meaning of the human itself 
in any context is a collaborative materio-semiotic endeavor.97  These insights point to the 
need to understand and re-evaluate our categories and boundaries, and our commitments 
to other central principles of international law in the face of subjects which are ‘always-
                                                             
93 Arvidsson, supra note 90, at 17-20. 
94 Ibid., at 24. 
95 Ibid., at 26. 
96 See for example, E. Libelich and E. Benvenisti, ‘The Obligation to Exercise Discretion in Warfare: Why 
Autonomous Weapon Systems are Unlawful’ in N. Bhuta et al (eds.), Autonomous Weapons Systems: Law, 
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already digital and material more-than-human: neither fully “machine” nor fully “human” 
and by necessity never autonomous nor free.’98  
These examples show the potential for new materialist thinking to give us insights 
into the way that law – specifically international law – constructs and manages 
subjectivities, and to help us see more clearly the ways that humans and technologies of all 
kinds are already entangled or mutually contingent.  However, for many, this picture of the 
human-machine hybrid entity is more dystopian than utopian.  And or me, the most 
pressing question is whether, in these continuously emergent human/machine 
amalgamations, the losing subjectivity/ies are very likely to be those who have always 
suffered materially in an actually existing legal, political and economic landscape of unequal 
power, rights and status.99  These structural power relations and their effects have been 
repeatedly pointed out by important critical international law scholars (including of a 
TWAILian and Marxist persuasion) who have tirelessly focussed attention on the implication 
of international law in sustaining unequal subjectivities in conjunction with ideas of empire, 
capital, race, gender and civilization.100 
New materialist thinkers are generally highly attentive to issues of power and the 
political purchase of their work. One of new materialism’s key propositions is that moving 
beyond binaries (of subject/object, male/female, culture/nature, for example) will help us to 
move beyond the dominations often carried out across those pairings. Nevertheless, critics 
of new materialism have argued that new materialism does not do enough to explain the 
‘continuities, durabilities and often monotonous predictabilities that characterize systems of 
power asymmetry’.101  These critics worry that new materialist thinking might serve to 
                                                             
98 Arvidsson, supra note 90, at 14.  
99 A. Cole ‘The Subject of Objects: Marx, New Materialism, and Queer forms of Life’ (2018) 22(2) Journal for 
Cultural Research 167, at 176-7. 
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obscure or turn attention away from sustained injustices that remain static and 
entrenched.102  
  It is concerning, then, if new materialist thinking might be used to open up new 
arguments that support reasons for international law to make rights more contingent, more 
fluid, and therefore less stable, reliable and protective for the vulnerable entities of the 
world.  For example, human beings’ protection through international law remains tenuous 
and fragile and international law provides numerous legal doctrines, which disserve the 
interests of individuals or communities.  These include the protection of international 
investors over the needs of local populations;103 or technologies of governance at borders, 
which discipline flows of people in the interests of states.104 International law plays a 
dubious role in a world ‘characterized by complex plays of forces in which patterned and 
predictable injustices are constantly reiterated.’105  
For this reason, embracing the ‘extrahuman’ is a rich opportunity to push for an 
international law that is more protective of aspects of the world which have not previously 
received protection. At the same time it cannot be at the expense of the marginalized and 
abused human beings – or other entities – of the world.  For these reasons, posthuman 
international law is productive as an imaginative and critical project, but one to be 
embraced with caution and with an eye to accountability and power, to which I now turn.     
 
4.2 Opacity and diffusion – finding power and accountability for international law 
 
The amorphous picture of authority produced by the entanglements and intra-active 
becomings of new materialist thought provokes us to look for power in new places and 
unexpected configurations, crossing the assumed boundaries of international law’s horizon.  
This should provide new opportunities to contest that power and hold it to account where 
necessary.  However, new materialism has been critiqued for its tendency to hollow out 
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responsibility and accountability.  In this section, I suggest that new materialist approaches 
help us to look for power in new spaces and configurations, but that we need to keep these 
insights firmly tethered to methodologies and theories that are avowedly structural. 
New materialists do not discount the workings of power and authority.  Rather, 
understanding ‘the nature of power in the fullness of its materiality’106 as Barad writes, is 
central to the critical project of new materialism.   Many new materialists seek to bring their 
work to bear on how power ‘works’ in the world.  As Coole and Frost put it, a major trend of 
new materialism is ‘explicitly political’.107  For them, ‘it means practical, politically engaged 
social theory, devoted to the critical analysis of actual conditions of existence and their 
inherent inequality.’108 It entails a critical global political economy.109  This is a critical new 
materialism.110  For example, Bennett’s engagement with the infrastructure of electricity 
grids in the United States is shot through with concern for how power and accountability 
can be found and engaged in such a system.  She writes that treating the grid as an 
assemblage of more than human agency ‘broadens the range of places to look for sources’ 
of harmful effects,111 to include looking ‘to long-term strings of events: to selfish intentions, 
to energy policy offering lucrative opportunities for energy trading while generating a 
tragedy of the commons, and to a psychic resistance to acknowledging a link between 
American energy use, American imperialism, and anti-Americanism.’112  These are deep and 
important structural questions of power and responsibility, which implicate international 
legal regulation: international energy law, environmental and financial laws, for example.   
These sorts of critical investigations through new materialist ideas help us to explain 
certain trends in international law. For example, they help explain the fact that we seem to 
increasingly find international law itself abstracted into regimes, infrastructure and 
organizations that are typically unexamined by international lawyers and that seem to evade 
the structures of accountability built into international law.113  We appear to be at moment 
where our normal channels of engagement and critique seem like blind alleys, or to lack 
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traction.  If we once understood the United Nations General Assembly and Security Council, 
The WTO, the International Court of Justice, the EU or African Union, to be the places where 
the international rules and regulations governing us were made, consolidated, disseminated 
and importantly, contested, these arenas now seem to have been hollowed out.  International 
law appears itself abstracted into regimes, infrastructure and organisations that are normally 
opaque to international lawyers.    
New materialist insights prompt us to look elsewhere to understand international 
law and its impacts on the world.  For instance, to look far beyond the state, and the public-
facing international institutions such as the United Nations or the International Criminal 
Court, and shine a spotlight on organisations such as the ISO,114 on infrastructure – often (at 
least partly) privately owned – such as water or gas pipelines, or Bennett’s example of 
electricity grids, or the fibre-optic cables that transmit flows of data under the sea.115  The 
complex matrix of state and non-state (or extrastate116) spaces, regulations and regimes 
may make power harder to locate and more difficult to hold to account.  Likewise, global 
markets and processes of financialization, data flows and nodes of storage, do not depend 
on what Johns calls ‘determined’ or ‘determinative’ power with which international lawyers 
have long been concerned.117  Rather, she argues, they ‘depend in large part on a sense of 
human and nonhuman actions and interactions taking place under circumstances of 
contingency and having contingent effects.’118  For these reasons, international lawyers 
might be ill-equipped to account for these shifts ‘in tempo, technique, technology, and 
terrain’.119 
 Roele, writing on the collective security regimes of the UN Security Council, similarly 
identifies the hollowing out and depoliticisation that accompanies techno-managerialism, 
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with its fetish for performance indicators and empty transparency initiatives.120  She argues 
that this leads to the creation of infra-law, which cannot be challenged or held accountable 
in the ways international lawyers expect.121 
Focusing on these disregarded spaces, and on the way that they are, in new 
materialist terms, entangled, can give us a better picture of how – and where – international 
law now works, where power lies with respect to it, and how that power might be made 
more accountable.  The risk, on the other hand, is that new materialist thinking can be 
harnessed by quite different political projects, to excuse just such hollowing out, making 
power less accountable and playing into the hands of those entities able to entangle 
themselves in problematic power-preserving or creating ways, as I turn to discuss below.   
First, it must be noted here that movements or dispersal of power in international 
law are not inherently bad.  On the contrary, they may be necessary to overcome injustice 
and inequality.  Critical international legal scholars have long argued that international law 
has served as an instrument (even a project) of empire and of (neo)liberal capitalist 
hegemony.122  Important work has reminded us that international law’s decision making 
forums, the content of its rules, and its power brokers, have long been dominated by a small 
club of mainly white, mainly male, Western Europeans and North Americans.123  In addition, 
international law has operated in a way that concentrates and reproduces power in the 
hands of the few, foreclosing other ways of individual and collective being.124  These uses of 
power through international law need to be contested, rather than protected.  
Nevertheless, what remains of crucial importance is the need to be able to see where power 
is operating, to understand how it is operating, and to be able to contest and resist its 
operation when needed.  Thus, critical projects focusing on the role of hegemony, 
imperialism and exploitation remain very relevant.  
But how do we know – in new materialist terms – when international law works as a 
tool to hold power to account, and when it masks the abuse of power, if agency is 
understood as an intra-acting, ever-shifting, relational process?  A number of critics of new 
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materialism argue that with its embrace of dynamism, fluidity and intra-active agency, new 
materialism can be unhelpful, providing tools that can undermine its critical and political 
promises. It can, they argue, be used to underpin an embrace of disorder, indeterminacy 
and risk by powerful entities, excusing violence and violation in the process.  As the 
environmental sociologist Pellizzoni argues, in work examining the links between new 
materialist ideas and neo-liberal capitalist approaches to nature and the environment, new 
materialism and neoliberalism share ontological ground.125  Both new materialism and 
neoliberalism are underpinned by an approach to the world that sees it as unstable and 
indeterminate, ‘such features representing the basis of dynamism and liveliness’.126  This 
produces an unhappy link between the openness of new materialist approaches to the 
world, and neo-liberal ideology and its embrace of risk, randomness, and volatility.127   
 Pellizzoni writes that ‘[t]urbulence and contingency, as produced by global trade, 
innovation-based competition and floating exchange rates’ have come to be interpreted not 
as ‘threatening uncontrollability, but lack of limits, room for manoeuvre, opening up of 
possibilities.’128  In Pellizzoni’s view, neoliberal, capitalist and anti-environmental agendas 
embrace these opportunities, through concepts such as resilience and system-adaptation, in 
ways that operate against the anti-capitalist and critical stance of new materialist 
thinkers.129 
The implications of indeterminacy, Pellizzoni argues, have undergone a radical shift.  
While once threatening, it ‘no longer is a problem, but rather becomes a resource.’130  It is 
unclear by whom, and for whom, this resource can be mobilised within the terms of new 
materialism.  For Pellizzoni, this means that new materialist precepts are uncomfortably 
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open to projects, to which new materialism’s founders are opposed, but which they cannot 
adequately contest without going beyond new materialism itself.131     
Similarly, Bruce Braun (whose eco-political geography takes in its sweep colonialism, 
extractivism and empire) tracks the parallel rise of new materialism’s non-deterministic, 
non-linear understandings of nature; and the neoliberalisation of environmental 
governance.  He argues that there is a direct relationship between neoliberalisation of 
nature and new materialists’ vibrant and indeterminate view of the same. However, he 
notes, the relationship is parasitic, with neoliberal approaches co-opting and attempting to 
contain the radical potential of new materialist insights for its own ends.132   
Thus while recognising that the dynamism of agential intra-action gives new 
materialist approaches particular creative purchase, if this is taken as an espousal of 
disorder and instability it has darker implications.  Taken to its extreme ends, indeterminacy, 
disorder and dynamism can be used to espouse violence and violation.  Disorder, instability 
and contingency dovetail with an embrace of what one scholar has promoted as ‘the ethos 
of rugged practitioners’ which prefers ‘simple’ tools that are ‘explicitly rough in character, 
practical in tone, and sub-optimal in their outlook.’133  Or, to put it another way, the 
business model and now cultural anthem of ‘move fast and break things.’134   
Although there have been problematic attempts to use international law as an 
ordering tool, imposing a certain kind of (liberal, Christian) order on the ‘uncivilised’,135 
there are also problematic implications to welcoming disorder for international law, as law 
is at least in theory an institution for predictability and stability, for regulating power 
according to clear rules.  And rules, as Chimni insists, can protect the weak and the 
oppressed from the powerful.136   
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  New materialists would surely reject any attempt to excuse violence and violation 
through new materialist approaches to the world.  Moreover, it must also be noted that 
new-materialism as an excuse for the embrace of neoliberal risk, techno-managerialism, or 
violent disorder rests on impoverished versions of new materialist thinking, as Bruce Braun 
has argued. 137 The link between neoliberal ideas and new materialism is not inherent, and 
represents neoliberal attempts of strategic containment of the critical and radical potential 
of new materialist insights.   
 Nevertheless, these critiques raise important questions about the nature, and 
purpose, of power in the world, and on what terms new materialist insights can evaluate 
‘good’ and ‘bad’ power.  It is with this issue, and the limits of a new materialist critique of 
power, to which I now turn.  I argue that the insights of new materialist thinking needs to be 
complemented with methodologies and approaches that take a more explicit position on 
evaluating the social, political and economic structures through which enduring power 
imbalances and exploitations are perpetuated, using both existing and emerging critical 
tools and practices.  It is to this point that I now turn in conclusion.     
 
     
5. Conclusion – dialogues beyond the limits of a new materialism. 
 
In order to resist the imposition of wrongs in situations of existing inequality we sometimes 
need something powerful: something with ‘teeth’.  But what separates ‘good’ power from 
‘bad’ power; power to hold to account, versus abuse of power, in a new materialist 
calculation?  Can new materialism answer this question within its own terms? This remains 
an important question when we look at new materialist insights for responding to actual 
material harms and the potential for international law to either overcome these harms, or 
to perpetuate them.   
Both the politics, and the critical purchase, of new materialism, have been critiqued 
by a number of scholars and thinkers.  For me, it is clear that the vast majority of scholars 
who fall under the banner of new materialism are politically, ethically, and intellectually 
committed to a world in which all entities, including and especially those who have been 
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marginalized, exploited or silenced are recognized as vital and vibrant contributors.  The 
insights of new materialists have the potential to open up a number of questions for 
international law, and to give us insights from different perspectives and from beyond our 
normal disciplinary boundaries. 
These steps are significant because international law has served as a handmaiden to 
powerful desires to exploit and dominate the objects of the world, which have been posited 
as simply there for the taking.  This is evidenced in international law’s imperial history, 
which relied – and continues to rely – on doctrines that erased whole peoples so that 
dominant powers could exploit them and their lands.138  It is shown in its foundations in the 
protection of private investors’ property rights over subservient nature.139  It is 
demonstrated in its efforts – notably in trade regimes such as the WTO - to purify itself of 
social, environmental, and political concerns.140  The global challenges of climate change, 
our reliance on toxic products and processes of production, and our porosity to viruses and 
other microbes, brought starkly into view in the ongoing Covid-19 Pandemic, prompt a 
rethinking of these anthropocentric suppositions and modus operandi for international law.   
Taking on board concern and care for other aspects of the world offers an ethics of 
‘mattering’ which pays close attention to our entanglement in the world, and its vibrant and 
ongoing connection to and through us, even when we experience ourselves as bounded and 
separate from it.  As Bennett argues, the ‘ethical aim becomes to distribute value more 
generously, to bodies as such.’141  If we recognize that the world is, in Haraway’s words, a 
‘spatial and temporal web of interspecies dependencies’142 then we can attempt to better 
acknowledge those aspects of the world that have been treated as merely ripe for 
exploitation, and also seek to protect them. It offers a reason for humility and deflates 
distended human pretensions that we are the only prism through which to see the world.  
This challenge is fundamental, if, as new materialists claim, ‘foregrounding material factors 
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and reconfiguring our very understanding of matter are prerequisites for any plausible 
account of coexistence and its conditions in the twenty-first century.’143  
Yet for a discipline where accountability and power within enduring structures are 
central questions, new materialism remains only one tool, which must be complemented by 
others.  This is because its central insights – into the entanglement of all entities in the 
world, the agency and vitality of the world beyond the human subject, and the physicality of 
matter – appear to have insufficient purchase when it comes to unsettling structural 
patterns and institutions.  These are patterns and institutions that continue to assert 
themselves, and be treated as – stable, bounded, and powerful entities in the world.  
Moreover, new materialist ideas, much against the creed of its committed founders – might 
contribute to the embrace of risk, instability and disorder, by already powerful entities and 
groups, against those whose agency and subjectivity is denied, and serve to further inscribe 
or excuse problematic techniques of violence and harm in international law.   
For these reasons, those of us working to consider how we can respond to pressing 
crises of justice and co-existence within the terms of international law as it now is, may find 
new materialism most powerful when harnessed in relation to, and in deep conversation 
with, other methodologies, theories and strategies that can grasp power or harm in more 
concrete ways.  These structural power relations and their effects have been repeatedly 
pointed out by critical international legal scholars (including TWAILian and Marxist scholars), 
who have focussed attention on the implication of international law in sustaining unequal 
subjectivities in conjunction with ideas of empire, capital, race, gender and civilization.144  
What might these existing strengths in critical international law scholarship bring to a new 
materialism for international law?   
The suggestion that new materialism is most productive when read alongside, and in 
dialogue with, older materialisms has already been raised by a number of scholars.145  For 
example, both Pellizzoni and Braun argue that bringing new materialism into dialogue with 
Marxist materialism has the potential to overcome the problems they identify. Recently, 
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legal historian Christopher Tomlins has brought together Bachelard’s literary and 
philosophical materialism with Benjamin’s Marxist historical materialism, claiming that 
bringing these perspectives together offers a ‘productively coupled point of entry to the 
current epoch’s “new materialisms”’ which is helpful for understanding so called ‘old’ and 
‘new’ materialisms, as well as space, time, justice and law.146   
Much new materialist work acknowledges and explicitly builds on other, older, 
materialisms,147 but overall, remains ambivalent in its relation to or connection with Marxist 
or historical materialism.148  However, recent work by critical, TWAIL and Marxist 
international legal scholars is well positioned to bring ‘old’ or Marxist materialism into 
dialogue with ‘new’ materialism.  With Braun, Pelizzoni, Tomlins, and others, I suggest that 
this is a productive conversation that can strengthen international legal scholars’ responses 
to injustice and harm, by bringing the explicitly structural critiques of these methodologies 
into stronger view, alongside new materialist insights.   
This prompts an important research agenda beyond the scope of this paper, and 
there are multiple entry points for this conversation.  Here, I point to two potential avenues 
for engagement.   
 The first is to bring into discussion new materialism’s open, dynamic and, thus, 
contingent subjectivities and agencies, with international legal scholarship on contingency.  
As set out above, one of new materialism’s central tenets is the fluid, intra-active, and 
emergent nature of subjectivity and agency.  As Barad puts it, agency is not a property of 
things, but ‘an enactment, a matter of possibilities for reconfiguring entanglements.’149  
When, where and in what patterns agency forms, and where it ‘sticks’ thus seems open, 
dynamic and contingent.   
Marks’ work on false contingency provides an important complement to this 
approach, showing what can be lost from view when contingency is assumed.  Starting from 
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Marx’s famous statement that ‘[men] make their own history, but they do not make it just 
as they please in circumstances they choose for themselves; rather they make it in present 
circumstances, given and inherited.’150  Marks suggests the term ‘false contingency’ can help 
us keep in view that ‘things can be, and quite frequently are, contingent without being 
random, accidental, or arbitrary.’151  There is, she writes, ‘a kind of necessity that must be 
reckoned into, rather than contrasted with, our sense of what it is to be an artefact of 
history.’152  Although arriving at this from different points, new materialist and critical 
international law scholars clearly reject false necessity – the idea that things must be as they 
are; that they are determined and fixed around us.  As Marks notes, to show that the world 
can be otherwise has long been a central, and hopeful, project of critical scholars.153   This 
work on the relationship between necessity and contingency can operate productively to 
bring the dynamism of new materialism into conversation with Marxist or historical 
materialism, illuminating the interplay between agency and structure.  As Marks puts it, in 
what could clearly ground a shared project between critical international law scholars and 
new materialists, the issue is ‘to investigate in particular circumstances what individual and 
collective action can achieve, what relation is established between structure and agency, 
how the world works as an organic totality.’154   
The need to pay attention to the interplay of contingency and necessity also 
motivates Fleur Johns’ recent thinking.155  In asking why international law’s locations of 
power seem currently so difficult for international lawyers to identify and grasp, she writes 
that our ‘fixations on necessity could perhaps have something to do with it … but fixations 
on contingency also seem to have played a role.’156  Certain forms of power, she writes, 
thrive on contingency.157  These ‘vectorial’ forms of power underpin datafication, 
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financialisation, and development.  They appear to require a fluid and dynamic system.158 
But at the same time, the given of the material infrastructure, such as undersea cables, on 
which they rely is relatively fixed, patterned and stable.159  Johns’ work, thus similarly 
prompts us to look for the patterned and predictable, the static and structured, that 
operates in complex relationship with flows and movement.  Here, again, is an opportunity 
to bring international law’s current critical tools into conversation with new materialism’s 
approach to agency and power in intra-action and flow, to powerful effect.   
The second point of productive engagement I want to point to here is work on the 
commodity.  For me, a powerful avenue opens up in bringing into view Marx’s writing on 
the processes of mystification that accompany commodification, alongside new materialist 
insights into the agency of things.  Marx defined the commodity as ‘an object outside us’ 
and moreover a thing of use to the human.160  This conception casts commodities as 
discrete things: things upon which people act.  But a commodity is also an ‘assemblage of 
many properties’161 and ‘the material depositaries of exchange value.’162   At the same time, 
as workers become commodified – mere products of their labour – the products of that 
labour take on an agency: they become, in Marx’s words ‘autonomous figures endowed 
with a life of their own.’163  This is ‘commodity fetishism,’ in which commodities can even be 
made to speak.164  Marx focussed on the harm produced through commodity fetishism, 
alienating people from their labour, and from each other; while the commodity fetish 
structured social relations behind a veil of ‘phantom-like objectivity.’165  Giving due to the 
agency of things, as Marx’s work makes clear, does not necessarily underpin a progressive or 
emancipatory project.  Recent important international law scholarship on capitalism as the 
structuring force and principle in international law can be deepened through new 
materialist insights into flows and nodes of agency: for instance in regulating and facilitating 
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datafication and financialisation as Johns points out.166  Meanwhile, critical international law 
scholarship, with its focus on the legacies of colonial domination and extraction, and the 
role of international law in commodification, can bring into view enduring structures that 
underpin how agency appears and coalesces around assemblages in human-non-human 
entanglements.  Bringing the explanatory power of new materialist and Marxist approaches 
to the agency of things can deepen our understanding of these process, and help craft more 
just responses. These are thus productive avenues for future research. 
  In conclusion, perhaps new materialism’s greatest potential rests in helping us to see 
in different ways where power lies, and how it works in intra-action across entities.   We 
may, however, need additional tools, which pay more attention to and have more concrete 
grasp on structures of power and their endurance in the world, to contest these harms and 
injustices.  International law scholarship is poised to make a significant contribution in 
bringing materialisms into dialogue, with the aim of furthering a shared project between 
new materialists and critical international law scholars: to recognise and respond to harm, 
violence and violation, and to disable the conceptual and practical apparatuses that 
perpetuate it.   
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